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DETAILING COMMERCIAL SPEECH:
WHAT PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETING
REVEALS ABOUT BANS ON COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Andrew J. Wolf *
INTRODUCTION
Pharmacies maintain a “potpourri” of records about the prescriptions people
bring to be filled, including the drugs, dosages, and prescribers.1 Eventually, this
information ends up in the hands of pharmaceutical companies, who use the data
to market or detail new medications to physicians based on their prescribing history.
Because the data are packaged by prescribing physicians,2 the data are commonly
referred to as prescriber-identifying information. New Hampshire, Vermont, and
Maine responded to this practice by passing legislation to ban the use of prescriber-
identifying information for marketing or commercial purposes.3 Because pharma-
ceutical companies are the largest purchasers of prescriber-identifying information
and data processing companies’ largest source of income, two data processing com-
panies immediately challenged the legislation as a violation of the First Amendment.4
The data processing companies argued that the legislation impermissibly limited their
ability to disseminate information.5 The Supreme Court agreed, but did so under the
framework of viewpoint discrimination, casting aside the commercial speech analysis
on which the lower courts had based their rulings.6
While the outcome of Sorrell v. IMS Health7 is but another example of the Court’s
effort to erode the commercial speech doctrine, Sorrell pushes the commercial speech
doctrine ever closer to that used to analyze noncommercial speech. Noncommercial
* J.D. candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2013. B.A., Case Western Reserve
University, 2010. I would like to thank my parents for everything they have done to support
me, David Mattern for his comments on this Note, and the editors of the William & Mary Bill
of Rights Journal for their editing and support. All mistakes are my own.
1 IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
2864 (2009).
2 See id.
3 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 1711-E (2) (2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318:47-f (2013);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(d) (2011), declared unconstitutional by Sorrell v. IMS Health
Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
4 Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 47–48 (noting that the complaint was filed within one month of the
law’s effective date).
5 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2661–62 (2011).
6 Id. at 2663.
7 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
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speech currently enjoys greater judicial scrutiny than commercial speech,8 but the
Court and commentators have questioned the foundations for that division. While
some argue that commercial speech is less valuable than political speech, and there-
fore undeserving of strict scrutiny,9 others question the commercial-noncommercial
divide and go so far as to advocate eliminating the commercial speech doctrine en-
tirely.10 I propose that commercial speech restrictions fit neatly into two classes:
restrictions which limit the time, place, or manner of expression, and holistic bans
on a class of speech. I argue that the Court should evaluate bans under the rubric of
strict scrutiny, while reserving the Court’s intermediate review under Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission11 for less restrictive time, place,
or manner restrictions. Evaluating commercial speech along these lines has the ad-
vantage of greater consistency in the doctrine, while balancing the values that under-
lie the First Amendment and commercially motivated speech.
Part I explores the parallel paths of commercial speech and the content-based
analysis that is central to noncommercial speech. Part II examines the legislation
enacted in New Hampshire, Vermont, and Maine, as well as the subsequent split
between the First and Second Circuits. It then analyzes Sorrell, emphasizing the
ways in which the Supreme Court has demonstrated its desire to alter the commer-
cial speech doctrine. Part III then develops the reasons why commercial speech
deserves greater protection in the context of outright bans. By examining the poli-
cies that support a separate commercial speech doctrine and the policies that support
consolidation, I propose a middle ground that balances the values underlying an
evolving area of Constitutional Law. Finally, Part IV demonstrates the application
of this framework to pharmaceutical detailing.
I. MODERN COMMERCIAL AND NONCOMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINES
A. Content-Based Speech Restrictions
Within the Court’s First Amendment doctrine, commercial speech and noncom-
mercial speech form two separate tracks under which a court may evaluate a law or
8 See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental
Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 472–73 (1996).
9 See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Commercial Speech and the Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrine: A Second Look at “The Greater Includes the Lesser,” 55 VAND. L. REV. 693 (2002);
Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process
and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1 (1979); Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech
and the Architecture of the First Amendment, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1181 (1988).
10 See, e.g., R.H. Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1977); Alex
Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech, 76 VA. L. REV. 627 (1990);
Daniel E. Troy, Advertising: Not “Low Value” Speech, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 85 (1999).
11 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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regulation that restricts speech.12 Within the noncommercial track of the First
Amendment, the road again splits into content-based restrictions and content-neutral
restrictions.13 Content-neutral restrictions are imposed without reference to the
content of the speech.14 In other words, the speech limit at issue is content-neutral
if the government’s justification for regulating the speech is not based on what is
being said.15 Content-based regulations are subjected to heightened or strict scrutiny,
where the government must articulate a compelling interest and demonstrate that the
means employed are the least restrictive means to further that interest.16
Content-neutral regulation that merely restricts the time, place, or manner of
speech is subjected to less rigorous scrutiny.17 Such restrictions are constitutional
provided that they “are justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest,
and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information.”18 In determining whether to apply this form of intermediate scrutiny,
the Court evaluates whether the government’s purpose is substantially related to the
content of the speech.19 For example, in Ward v. Rock Against Racism,20 the Court
found that mere sound restrictions without regard to the particular performance in
Central Park were content-neutral time, place, or manner restrictions.21
Viewpoint discrimination is an “especially egregious” type of content-based
discrimination in which the government limits speech based on disagreement with
a particular opinion the speaker holds.22 To illustrate the difference, the government
may pass a law prohibiting threats against the President, but the government may not
enforce a law that only prohibits threats against the President that also mention an
objection to a particular policy.23 While the ban on threatening the President may
further a compelling governmental interest, the requirement that the would-be
12 See, e.g., R. GEORGE WRIGHT, SELLING WORDS 54–55 (1997).
13 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 3:9 (2012).
14 See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
15 Id.
16 See, e.g., Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); see also
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“Content-based regulations are pre-
sumptively invalid.”).
17 See, e.g., Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
18 Id. (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
19 See id. at 798–99.
20 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
21 Id. at 792.
22 SMOLLA, supra note 13, § 3:9.
23 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 379–80, 388 (1992) (invalidating a state
statute which criminalized cross burning “which one knows or has reasonable grounds to
know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion
or gender” on the grounds that the list of bases was underinclusive, going beyond mere
content-based regulation to viewpoint discrimination).
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violator also voice objection to a specific government policy has nothing to do with
the government purpose and impermissibly discriminates based on the speaker’s
viewpoint.24 Because viewpoint discrimination thwarts the very goals that the First
Amendment seeks to achieve, “it is all but dispositive to conclude that a law is
content-based and, in practice, viewpoint-discriminatory.”25
Unlike noncommercial speech, commercial speech, most clearly exemplified by
advertising, is thought to be both less important and less susceptible to unjustified
governmental intrusion.26 In other words, protecting an individual who chooses to
speak out against the government’s action in a war, for example, is far more impor-
tant than granting a corporation wide latitude to advertise its products in any way
it desires. The harm to public discourse that comes from silencing individuals is far
greater than the harm that arises when a company cannot advertise a particular
product in a particular way. Under this rationale, commercial speech was arguably
unprotected for nearly two centuries.27
B. Commercial Speech
Commercial speech is generally defined as speech that proposes a commercial
transaction.28 But, differentiating commercial and noncommercial speech may be
more difficult than it first appears.29 The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized
that most commercial speech contains forms of both commercial and noncommer-
cial speech.30 For example, speech during a labor dispute is “primarily economic”
despite its clear political and social implications, and advertisements generally
contain at least some message beyond the attempt to encourage a sale.31 The Court
has proposed that the distinction for the purpose of determining the difference
24 See id. at 388.
25 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011).
26 See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
27 See id. For a critique of the Court’s first proclamation that commercial speech is not
protected, see Kozinski & Banner, supra note 10, at 627 (arguing that the Court “plucked the
commercial speech doctrine out of thin air”).
28 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980).
29 See Nat Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, 58 MD.
L. REV. 55, 79 (1999).
30 See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 419 (1993)
(“This . . . case illustrates the difficulty of drawing bright lines that will clearly cabin com-
mercial speech in a distinct category.”); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762–65 (1976). But see, e.g., Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S.
at 561 (characterizing a ban on advertisements encouraging the use of electricity as “related
solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience”).
31 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762–65.
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between commercial and noncommercial speech is dictated by “common sense,”32
and has considered factors such as the extent to which economic motives drive the
speech or whether the speech references a specific product.33 Even when the Court
examines laws that bar advertising a price—something that appears exclusively
commercial—the Court finds a mix of commercial and noncommercial speech.34 For
example, in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,35 the Court found that Rhode Island
barred advertising the price of alcohol merely because it wished to discourage al-
cohol consumption.36 Scholars have argued that even the test which asks whether the
speech proposes a commercial transaction can produce unintended results, especially
when advertisements do not directly promote the product or reveal its price.37 Once
a court determines that the speech at issue is commercial or noncommercial, what
is the effect of accompanying speech?38 In other words, if some part of the speech
proposes a commercial transaction, is everything the actor said commercial speech,
or only the part that directly proposes a commercial transaction?39 Few court cases
analyze the commercial-noncommercial distinction, however, simply choosing one
and moving to the more developed areas of the Court’s doctrine.40
32 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978). The common-sense
distinction may also be understood as whether the speech contributes to the marketplace of
ideas or the marketplace of goods and services. See Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 9, at 2.
33 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983). For a critique of the Court’s
doctrine on the question of classifying speech as commercial or noncommercial, see WRIGHT,
supra note 12, at 54–57.
34 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
35 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
36 Id. at 499 (“[T]he State retains less regulatory authority when its commercial speech
restrictions strike at ‘the substance of the information communicated’ rather than the ‘com-
mercial aspect of [it].’” (quoting Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85,
96 (1977); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 701 n.28 (1977))).
37 Kozinski & Banner, supra note 10, at 63. Judge Kozinski and Professor Banner ask
whether the following television commercial really proposes a commercial transaction: 
An attractive woman knocks on the door of [Michael J. Fox’s] apart-
ment and asks if he has a Diet Pepsi. He tells her he does, but opens his
refrigerator and discovers that he doesn’t; this sets him off down the
fire escape and through a series of close calls and near mishaps before
he obtains a can of Diet Pepsi and returns to his apartment, soaking wet
and exhausted, to give the can to his startled neighbor.
Id. For a more extensive critique of the commercial-noncommercial distinction, see id. at 638–48.
38 See Victor Brudney, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 53 B.C. L. REV.
1153, 1157–58 (2012).
39 See id. 
40 See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 9, at 1184–85 (“[T]he Supreme Court, for all it has said
about commercial speech, has conspicuously avoided saying just what it is.”). Professor Nat
Stern argues that the apparent imprecision of the commercial-noncommercial distinction
plays little role in the doctrine because in most cases the distinction is easy to discern. Stern,
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Throughout most of the First Amendment’s history, courts consistently found that
commercial speech was not entitled to any protection under the First Amendment.41
In 1975, in Bigelow v. Virginia,42 the Court signaled its intent to extend some pro-
tection to commercial speech when it invalidated a Virginia statute that prohibited
advertising abortions.43 Recognizing that the Bigelow Court may have been moti-
vated by the advocacy of abortion, rather than a pure desire to expand First Amend-
ment protection to advertising, the Court clarified that the First Amendment provides
at least some protection for purely commercial speech.44 Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council45 reasoned that “[a]dvertising, how-
ever tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dissemination
of information.”46 The Court struck down a Virginia law prohibiting the advertise-
ment of prescription medication prices, finding that the ban did not “directly affect”
the State’s interest in maintaining the professional standards of pharmacists.47
In Central Hudson, the Court articulated a new test to determine whether com-
mercial speech restrictions violate the First Amendment.48 First, the court asks
whether the speech at issue is misleading or concerns unlawful activity.49 If neither
is true, then the court determines whether the government’s interest in passing the
law is substantial.50 Finding a substantial government interest, the last two inquiries
test the tailoring of the law or regulation by asking whether the law or regulation
“directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.”51 In Central Hudson, the Court
struck down the regulation as improperly tailored to the government interest.52 The
Court has since clarified that the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test, like time,
supra note 29, at 94–101. Even when commentators could criticize the Court’s answer to the
commercial-noncommercial question, commentators tend to fault the Court for its tailoring
analysis. Id. at 96–98.
41 See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 9, at 58 (citing Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52
(1942)).
42 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
43 Id.
44 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 760–61 (1976).
45 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
46 Id. at 765.
47 Id. at 769.
48 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566, 568 (1980)
(striking down a regulation that banned advertising to “promote the use of electricity”).
49 Id. at 566.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 569–71 (finding that the State’s interest in maintaining its current electric service
structure was not directly served by the regulation and that the regulation was so extensive
it actually prohibited advertising that would have served the government’s interest in con-
serving energy).
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place, and manner restrictions, does not require the least restrictive means possible.53
Rather, the law or regulation must not “burden substantially more speech than is
necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.”54
Because the Court afforded commercial speech less protection than that given
to noncommercial speech, some laws and regulations took advantage of the different
standards.55 One such case made it to the Supreme Court in 1992.56 The City of
Cincinnati revoked permits allowing freestanding newsracks to display advertisement-
heavy magazines, but continued to extend permits to newsracks that displayed news-
papers.57 Cincinnati argued that revoking the permits furthered the substantial
government purpose of increasing the safety and appearance of city streets and
sidewalks.58 The Supreme Court struck down Cincinnati’s ban on the use of news-
racks by magazines, arguing that the commercial-noncommercial distinction bore
no relation to the purported interests of the city.59 Along the lines of 44 Liquormart,
the government may not regulate commercial speech because of the message it
conveys,60 whether that message is the promotion of alcohol or a “naked assertion
that commercial speech has ‘low value.’”61
A pattern emerges from each of these cases: the Court found the speech to be
commercial but nevertheless struck down the law or regulation under the purport-
edly more lenient commercial speech doctrine. In some cases, the Court found the
law improperly tailored to the government’s interest;62 in others, the Court focused
on the government’s apparent interests.63 Regardless of the reason, it was clear that
the Court gave the First Amendment salience in the area of commercial speech.
II. PRESCRIBER-IDENTIFYING INFORMATION & COMMERCIAL SPEECH
A. Prescriber-Identifying Information
Prescriber-identifying information groups data about the particular drugs and
dosages a physician prescribes so that data-analyzing companies can discern any
53 Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 478 (1989).
54 Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)).
55 See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
56 Id.
57 Id. at 412–13.
58 Id. at 412.
59 Id. at 424 (“Not only does Cincinnati’s categorical ban on commercial newsracks place
too much importance on the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech, but
in this case, the distinction bears no relationship whatsoever to the particular interests that
the city has asserted.”).
60 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 499 (1996).
61 Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 429.
62 See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 507; Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 769 (1976).
63 See, e.g., Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 424.
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patterns.64 Pharmacies then remove any personal information about the patient,
package the data, and sell the data to data processing companies.65 Data process-
ing companies then analyze the data and sell it to researchers and pharmaceutical
companies.66 Pharmaceutical companies who purchase the data use it in detailing,
a process in which marketing representatives market the company’s products di-
rectly to doctors.67 By examining the prescribing practices of physicians, detailers
can develop marketing strategies to push certain products, either encouraging doc-
tors to prescribe a drug when they otherwise would not, or encouraging doctors to
replace certain drugs with those of the pharmaceutical company.68
Although detailers are more effective with prescriber-identifying information,
detailing itself is expensive.69 Due to expense, pharmaceutical companies typically
only detail patent-protected, name-brand drugs.70 Generic brands, by contrast, gen-
erally do not generate adequate profit margins to support marketing through one-on-
one visits with physicians.71 IMS Health Inc. (IMS), the company-party in Sorrell,
estimates that in 2004 alone, pharmaceutical companies spent $27.7 billion on mar-
keting activities, compared to $29.6 billion on research and development.72 Almost
sixty percent of all money spent on marketing goes toward detailing.73 Primary care
physicians receive an average of twenty-eight detailer visits per week, and special-
ists receive fourteen.74 Detailing is without a doubt a crucial component of a phar-
maceutical company’s budget.
In response to the growth of the pharmaceutical-detailing business, Maine, New
Hampshire, and Vermont enacted laws to prevent the use of such data for marketing
64 IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 267 (2d. Cir. 2010), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2653
(2011).
65 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2660 (2011). Data processing companies
are pejoratively referred to as “data miners.” See, e.g., IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d
42, 45 (1st Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2864 (2009).
66 Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 73–74.
67 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2659–60.
68 Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 46.
69 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2660.
70 Id.
71 Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 46.
72 Marc-André Gagnon & Joel Lexchin, The Cost of Pushing Pills: A New Estimate of
Pharmaceutical Promotion Expenditures in the United States, 5 PLOS MED. 29, 29 (2008),
available at http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pmed.0050001.
73 BYRON SCHLOMACH, GOLDWATER INSTITUTE, A POUND OF CURE: HOW ACA-
DEMIC DETAILING COULD LIMIT ACCESS TO PHARMACEUTICALS 2 (2012), available at
http://goldwaterinstitute.org/sites/default/files/policy%20Brief%20032712%20drug
%20Detailing.pdf.
74 Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 47. The Ayotte court described the detailer’s strategy as one in
which the detailer “usually . . . present[s] herself as a helpful purveyor of pharmaceutical
information and research.” Id. at 46.
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or commercial purposes.75 While the details of each statute vary, all three states
included an express ban on the use of prescriber-identifying information in the
pharmaceutical detailing process.76 Each of the three statutes allows companies to
use the data absent prescriber-identifying information, and all three allow the use of
such data for other, noncommercial or non-market purposes.77 According to the
Vermont statute, physicians had the option of opting in to disclose physician-
identifying information,78 while the Maine statute provided an opt-out procedure.79
The statutes also elaborated on several justifications for these laws: protecting physi-
cian confidentiality80 and minimizing the biased information available to prescribers.81
Finally, the statutes purported to reduce prescription drug costs by minimizing mar-
keting fees.82 Almost immediately after each statute passed the state legislature, data
processing companies sued for violations of the First Amendment, arguing that the
states had violated their rights to disseminate information.83
In New Hampshire, the District Court, applying the test in Central Hudson,
found that the statute was not adequately tailored to pass intermediate scrutiny.84
The First Circuit reversed, finding that the statute regulated conduct rather than
75 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 1711-E (2) (2012) (“any marketing purpose”); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 318:47-f (2013) (“any commercial purpose”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631
(d) (2011) (“marketing or promoting a prescription drug”), declared unconstitutional by
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
76 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 1711-E (2) (limiting the regulation to use “for any marketing
purpose”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318:47-f (allowing use for “pharmacy reimbursement;
formulary compliance; care management; utilization review by a health care provider, the
patient’s insurance provider or the agent of either; health care research; or as otherwise
provided by law”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631 (e)(1) (allowing use for “the sale, license,
exchange for value, or use, of regulated records for the limited purposes of pharmacy reim-
bursement; prescription drug formulary compliance; patient care management; utilization
review by a health care professional, the patient’s health insurer, or the agent of either; or
health care research”).
77 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 1711-E(2); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318:47-f (2013); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(e).
78 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(c), (d).
79 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 1711-E (4) (repealed 2012).
80 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 1711-E (1-B) (repealed 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(a).
81 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 1711-E (1-B.A) (repealed 2012) (claiming that decreased
influence of drug representatives “will build patient and prescriber confidence in the health
care system”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(a).
82 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 1711-E (1-B.B) (repealed 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 4631(a).
83 See, e.g., IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 47–48 (1st Cir. 2008), cert. denied,
129 S. Ct. 2864 (2009). 
84 IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 490 F. Supp. 2d 163, 181–83 (D.N.H. 2007), rev’d, 550
F.3d 42, cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2864 (2009).
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speech.85 The court stated that “[w]hile the plaintiffs lip-synch the mantra of promot-
ing the free flow of information, the lyrics do not fit the tune.”86 Absent speech, the
court applied rational basis review, finding the New Hampshire statute constitu-
tional.87 The First Circuit went on to find that even if the law regulated speech, it
would pass First Amendment scrutiny under Central Hudson.88 The Court of Appeals
similarly denied IMS’s appeal in the Maine case, finding that, like the New Hampshire
Law, Maine’s statute was consistent with the First Amendment.89 The Court went
on to say that Maine’s law was even more narrowly tailored because physicians had
more protection from sharing data about their prescribing practices.90
In Vermont, the District Court, also applying Central Hudson, found the statute
constitutional.91 The Second Circuit reversed, finding that the Vermont law did not
pass intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson.92 The Second Circuit dismissed
the State’s interest in medical privacy as “too speculative”93 and found that the statute
did not “advance the state’s interests in public health and reduc[e] costs in a direct
and material way.”94 Due to the split between the First and Second Circuits, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.95
B. The Supreme Court and Prescription Detailing
1. Commercial Speech?
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority of the Court, found that the Vermont
statute constituted content-based viewpoint discrimination because it prevented de-
tailers from obtaining prescriber-identifying information.96 In defending the statute,
85 Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 51–52 (“We say that the challenged elements of the Prescription
Information Law principally regulate conduct because those provisions serve only to restrict
the ability of data miners to aggregate, compile, and transfer information destined for narrowly
defined commercial ends.”).
86 Id. at 53.
87 Id. at 54 (describing the law as “a species of economic regulation”).
88 Id. at 60.
89 IMS Health Inc. v. Mills, 616 F.3d 7, 18–19 (1st Cir. 2010), vacated sub nom. IMS Health,
Inc. v. Schneider, 131 S. Ct. 3091 (2011).
90 Id. at 19.
91 IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 631 F. Supp. 2d 434, 440 (D. Vt. 2009), rev’d, 630 F.3d 263
(2d. Cir. 2010), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
92 Sorrell, 630 F.3d at 267.
93 Id. at 276.
94 Id. at 277.
95 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2662 (2011).
96 Id. at 2663. This holding has already been criticized for confusing the commercial
speech doctrine and especially what constitutes a protected “viewpoint.” See Tamara R.
Piety, “A Necessary Cost of Freedom”? The Incoherence of Sorrell v. IMS, 64 ALA. L. REV.
1, 4, 6 (2012).
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Vermont argued that detailers “convey messages that ‘are often in conflict with the
goals of the state.’”97 The Court reacted to this defense by finding that the statute
went “beyond mere content discrimination, to actual viewpoint discrimination” be-
cause it discriminated both on the content of the message and the specific speaker.98
Finding both content and viewpoint discrimination, the Court subjected the Vermont
statute to “heightened scrutiny.”99
Vermont argued that even if the speech is not content-neutral, the statute should
be subjected to minimum scrutiny because it constitutes commercial speech.100 Ac-
knowledging that commercial speech was entitled to less judicial scrutiny, the Court
found that “the outcome is the same”101 and moved on to analyze the State’s interests
and the law’s tailoring to serve those interests.
2. Vermont’s State Interests
Vermont asserted that physicians have reasonable expectations that their pre-
scription practices remain confidential, disclosed only to the patient and his or her
pharmacist.102 While agreeing that physicians may have that expectation, the Court
skipped over the question of whether the State’s interest was substantial or important
to find that the statute was in no way tailored to serve that interest.103 Specifically,
the Court found that because prescriber-identifying information was available for
any purpose save pharmaceutical detailing, physicians’ expectations of privacy were
still not met.104 Rejecting Vermont’s interest in physician confidentiality, the Court
turned to examine the State’s interests in “lowering the costs of medical services and
promoting public health.”105
Vermont argued that preventing prescription detailing would sufficiently under-
mine name-brand pharmaceutical sales, resulting in greater prescriptions for safer
and less expensive generic medications.106 The Court never said whether this state
interest is important or substantial, but stated that decreasing healthcare costs “may
be proper.”107 The importance of the state interest was irrelevant because the Court
97 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2663 (quoting 2007 Vt. Acts & Resolves 80, § 1(3)).
98 Id. (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992)).
99 Id. at 2664 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
100 Id. at 2667.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 2668.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 2668–69 (“Vermont has given its doctors a contrived choice: Either consent, which
will allow your prescriber-identifying information to be disseminated and used without con-
straint; or, withhold consent, which will allow your information to be used by those speakers
whose message the State supports.”).
105 Id. at 2670.
106 Id.
107 Id.
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rejected the statute by characterizing its tailoring as an “indirect means of restraining
certain speech by certain speakers.”108 The majority latched on to the Court’s previ-
ously stated objections to paternalistic laws109 and characterized the law as an effort to
prevent doctors from making bad decisions—to prescribe name-brand medication—
by hiding truthful information.110 In other words, the state sought to promote generic
medications by hampering the marketing efforts of competing name-brand drugs.
3. Viewpoint Discrimination
Although the Court acknowledged Vermont’s stated interests, the opinion fo-
cuses on characterizing the statute as viewpoint discriminatory. First, the Court
found that the statute discriminated based on the message conveyed by pharmaceuti-
cal companies.111 While use of prescriber-identifying information was barred for
“marketing purposes,”112 other sections of the statute permitted such data to be used
in “educational communications.”113 The Court also noted that the statute discrimi-
nated against the promotion of name-brand pharmaceuticals, favoring generic sub-
stitutes.114 Characterizing the name-brand versus generic medication debate as an
issue of public importance, the majority accused Vermont of “hamstring[ing]” the
opposition to generic drugs due to the State’s failure to persuade physicians to
accept its own view.115
In addition to finding discrimination against the message of pharmaceutical
detailers, the Court also found discrimination against the speakers themselves—
pharmaceutical companies.116 At oral argument, Vermont reinterpreted the statute
to apply to other entities like health insurers, but the Court rebuffed this reinterpre-
tation as “too late in the day.”117 Even if Vermont’s new interpretation were true, the
108 Id.
109 See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996) (“The First
Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in
the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good.”).
110 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2670–71.
111 Id. at 2663.
112 Id. at 2659.
113 See id. at 2663 (quoting VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(e)(4) (2012), declared unconsti-
tutional by Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. 2653).
114 Id. (“[T]he Vermont Legislature explained that detailers, in particular those who pro-
mote brand name drugs, convey messages that ‘are often in conflict with the goals of the
state.’” (quoting 2007 Vt. Acts & Resolves 80, § 1(3))).
115 Id. at 2671 (“Likewise the State may not seek to remove a popular but disfavored prod-
uct from the marketplace by prohibiting truthful, nonmisleading advertisements that contain
impressive endorsements or catchy jingles.”).
116 Id. at 2663.
117 Id. at 2662. Vermont had not previously asserted that the law applied to health insurers.
Id.
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statute still prohibits pharmaceutical companies and health insurers from speaking
while simultaneously allowing “academic researchers” access to the same forum.118
Finding inadequate justification for discrimination against both a particular view-
point and specific speakers, the Court struck down Vermont’s statute as a violation
of the First Amendment.119
III. WHEN COMMERCIAL SPEECH DESERVES STRICT SCRUTINY
The commercial and noncommercial speech doctrines are not as distinct as they
appear. While the language of some cases gives the impression that the choice be-
tween labeling the speech at issue “commercial” or “noncommercial” is the differ-
ence between the law being upheld and the law being struck down, the holdings of
those cases are far more mixed. Instead, content- and speaker-neutral speech par-
allels classic commercial speech—speech intended primarily or solely to “propose
a commercial transaction.”120 Both are afforded intermediate scrutiny unless there
is some reason to render the speech suspect.121 But, certain commercial speech reg-
ulations, those which have been characterized as “paternalistic”122 or “overbroad,”123
have frequently been struck down under a standard that appears more stringent than
intermediate scrutiny.124 This inexplicit “heightened scrutiny” appears to closely
track the content-based speech doctrine. In short, the Court generally reviews speech
restrictions, whether commercial or otherwise, using a form of intermediate scrutiny,
but elevates that scrutiny to strict or “heightened” when certain red flags indicate
that the restriction may encroach on a speaker’s First Amendment rights.
The commercial speech doctrine developed because it was thought that certain
kinds of speech do not contribute so significantly to public discourse that they
deserve strict protection under the First Amendment.125 That commercial speech was
118 Id.
119 Id. at 2659.
120 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385
(1973).
121 See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 8, at 479–80.
122 See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 507 (1996).
123 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 & n.6
(1980) (quoting Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977)).
124 ROBERT L. KERR, THE CORPORATE FREE-SPEECH MOVEMENT 230–31 (2008); see also
Charles Fischette, A New Architecture of Commercial Speech Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 663, 675 (noting that the “third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test must do
essentially all of the work”).
125 See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975) (“The relationship of speech to the
marketplace of products or of services does not make it valueless in the marketplace of ideas.”)
In fact, the case normally cited for the proposition that the First Amendment extends no pro-
tection to commercial speech lacks any analysis of the policy reasons or First Amendment
doctrines that support the Court’s decision. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942);
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already highly regulated further justified its lack of protection.126 In fact, the Court
prior to 1975 found that the First Amendment did not protect any commercial
speech.127 The Court, however, rejected the view that commercial speech does not
contribute to public discourse in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, finding that com-
mercial information in a free enterprise economy is part of the public discourse.128
The Court stated that “[i]t is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the
aggregate, be intelligent and well informed.”129 Subsequent cases emphasized the
informational role of advertising, which served as the primary reason for affording
it First Amendment protection.130 Clarifying the commercial speech doctrine thus
demands attention to the policies that underlie both the reasons to afford it First
Amendment protection and the policies that favor separating commercial speech due
to its comparatively lower value.
I begin by defining what types of commercial speech should be evaluated under
the content-based First Amendment doctrine. I then argue that this change is both
similar to recent commercial speech cases and more consistent with the values that
underlie freedom of speech. Finally, I conclude by demonstrating how the proposal
would have affected the rationale in Sorrell.
A. Bans
Laws and regulations that enact a ban, whether directly or indirectly, prohibit
the dissemination of particular facts without regard to the manner in which those
facts are communicated. For example, a law barring the advertisement of cigarettes
is different than a law which permits advertising tobacco products but requires those
advertisements to lack features which have the potential to encourage children to
smoke. Similarly, a law that bars advertising used cars is different than a law which
supra note 41 and accompanying text. Many scholars still argue that elevating commercial
speech to the level of political speech may dilute the value of political speech, making it
necessary to maintain separate tracks for commercial and noncommercial speech. See, e.g.,
Berman, supra note 9; Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 9, at 6; Schauer, supra note 9.
126 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980).
127 See, e.g., Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54 (upholding a New York law prohibiting the distri-
bution of advertising materials upon any street); see also Samuel A. DiLullo, The Present
Status of Commercial Speech: Looking for a Clear Definition, 90 DICK. L. REV. 705, 707–12
(1986). The Supreme Court was “squarely” confronted with the issue of First Amendment
protection for commercial speech in 1976. Id. at 712.
128 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 765 (1976).
129 Id. The Court continued, stating that the free flow of information in the economy is
essential to informing decisions about how the economy should be “regulated or altered.” Id.
130 See, e.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 481–82 (1995); Cent. Hudson,
447 U.S. at 563; see also Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48
UCLA L. REV. 1, 1 (2000).
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would allow advertisements, but only if those advertisements accurately depicted
the condition of the product being sold. Whether a law or regulation bars a class of
information is, in a way, a question about the breadth of the law. Does the law
prohibit a particular kind of advertising altogether, or does it afford the speaker a
way to advertise, so long as certain other requirements are met? Those other require-
ments could include prohibiting information likely to mislead a person or mandating
additional disclosures or warnings. The content of the requirements is immaterial so
long as the speaker is afforded an opportunity to spread the information.
For a real world example, consider the facts of Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,131
a 1995 Supreme Court case. Coors Brewing Company challenged a federal regu-
lation barring beer companies from placing the alcoholic content of beer on their
bottles.132 The government justified the regulation by arguing that allowing beer
companies to advertise the alcoholic content would create “strength wars” between
beer companies, each striving to increase the alcoholic content of their product.133
The regulation at issue in Coors effectively banned breweries from advertising the
alcoholic content of beer.134 Alternatives could have included requiring warnings
about consuming excess alcohol or limiting the size of the disclosure on the can or
bottle, so that alcoholic content did not become the focus of any company’s pack-
aging. Both strategies would have arguably furthered the government’s interest, but
still allowed beer companies to distribute information about the alcoholic content
of their products. Ultimately, the Supreme Court struck down the regulation as
insufficiently tailored to the government’s interest.135
B. Two Doctrinal Paths?
On its face, applying strict scrutiny to commercial speech appears to dramati-
cally change how the Court has interpreted the First Amendment, but many of the
same factors will enter into courts’ analyses. The 44 Liquormart Court first ex-
plained why the commercial speech doctrine appears to be applied inconsistently:
When a State regulates commercial messages to protect consum-
ers from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales practices, or
requires the disclosure of beneficial consumer information, the
purpose of its regulation is consistent with the reasons for accord-
ing constitutional protection to commercial speech and therefore
131 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
132 Id. at 478–81.
133 Id. at 483. The government also asserted a state interest in preserving its regulatory
power over the alcohol industry in light of the Twenty-First Amendment, but the Court dis-
missed that interest as insubstantial. Id. at 485–86.
134 Id. at 478.
135 Id. at 490.
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justifies less than strict review. However, when a state entirely
prohibits the dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading commer-
cial messages for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair
bargaining process, there is far less reason to depart from the
rigorous review that the First Amendment generally demands.136
1. Pretextual Laws
Courts have implicitly applied the distinction in 44 Liquormart by engaging in
a detailed analysis of the state interests alleged to support the law at issue.137 Courts
appear to approach the State interests holistically in an effort to discern the true pur-
pose of a speech restriction. Since the relevant purpose is the State’s actual interest,
rather than any legitimate purpose, courts are on the lookout for government pur-
poses that serve as a pretext for achieving some other unstated goal. Such pretextual
laws have arisen in two contexts: restrictions that strive to undermine an entire
industry that produces a potentially harmful product138 and restrictions that limit
commercial speech merely because it is commercial.139
Alcohol is a prime example of a product that poses safety concerns, both to
those who consume it and to those who come into contact with the consumer on the
road, for example. Few would question a state’s decision to impose restrictions on
the consumption of alcohol or the activities in which a person who has consumed
it engages. Because the state’s interest in preventing dangers arising from alcohol
consumption is so strong, the question of the constitutionality of a law that limits
speech about alcohol is primarily one of tailoring. Does banning advertisements for
alcoholic beverages actually further the state’s interest in preventing the dangers that
arise from the consumption of alcohol? The 44 Liquormart Court recognized that
the State’s interest at issue was minimizing the consumption of alcohol, rather than
protecting citizens from any direct harm caused by the way liquor companies spoke
about their products: “[B]ans often serve only to obscure an ‘underlying govern-
mental policy’ that could be implemented without regulating speech.”140 The Court
further observed that targeting truthful, nonmisleading speech rarely protects con-
sumers from the harms that the State seeks to prevent anyway.141 Thus, by subjecting
136 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996).
137 See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 762–64 (1976) (observing that few commercial messages lack any public in-
terest element).
138 See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. 484.
139 See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
140 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 503 (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 n.9 (1980)); see also Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (striking
down a federal regulation barring the labeling of beer with its alcoholic content).
141 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 503.
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the State’s interest to heightened scrutiny, the Court implicitly reviewed whether the
speech at issue was really speech deserving of protection.
A similar inquiry influenced the Sorrell Court. The Court saw Vermont’s law
as an effort to shift the market from one that favored high-priced name-brand drugs
to a market that was more favorable to lower-priced generic drugs.142 Although the
Court ultimately chose to decide the case under the framework of viewpoint discrim-
ination,143 it recognized that the Vermont law would fail the Central Hudson test
under the tailoring analysis.144 The State’s interest in confidentiality was not fur-
thered by the law because anyone other than pharmaceutical companies could pur-
chase the data,145 and the State’s interest in lowering the costs of medical services
was only indirectly furthered by limiting the effectiveness of detailing.146 The Court’s
in-depth review into the mechanisms through which Vermont intended to accom-
plish its stated purposes reveals more than a cursory review, although the Court
purported to apply a lesser form of judicial scrutiny.147 The Court’s opinion demon-
strates that its commercial speech analysis entails a different level of scrutiny by
label only. Sorrell and 44 Liquormart are but two examples of how the Court has
used the tailoring analysis under Central Hudson to conduct a detailed evaluation of
whether the speech restriction directly furthers the purported state interest or whether
the speech restriction is a pretext for achieving a distantly related objective.148
In an extreme case, the Court ignored that the speech was commercial altogether
when it appeared that the commercial aspect was a mere pretext for furthering an-
other unrelated government interest. The law at issue in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery
Network, Inc.149 was a Cincinnati ordinance that removed all freestanding magazine
racks from the city, while allowing similar newspaper dispensers to remain.150 The
City argued that it was furthering an interest in maintaining safe and aesthetically
pleasing streets.151 It chose to eliminate only magazine racks, however, because mag-
azines contained predominantly advertisements, instead of noncommercial news.152
The Court found the relationship between the law and the state interest so distant
that the majority did not even analyze the four factors under the Central Hudson
142 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663 (2011).
143 Id. (“Vermont’s law goes even beyond mere content discrimination, to actual viewpoint
discrimination”(quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992)) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)).
144 Id. at 2667–68.
145 Id. at 2668.
146 Id. at 2670.
147 See id. at 2667.
148 For more examples of the Court’s use of Central Hudson tailoring to strike down over-
broad laws, see KERR, supra note 124, at 230–31.
149 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
150 Id. at 412–15.
151 Id. at 418–19.
152 Id. at 412–13, 424.
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test.153 Discovery Network therefore highlights the Court’s reluctance to follow its
own established test and to engage in more rigorous scrutiny when a speech restric-
tion bears less than a direct connection to the purported state interest.
2. Paternalism
In addition to using Central Hudson’s tailoring analysis to subject commercial
speech restrictions to more exacting scrutiny, the Court has shown little patience for
laws it deems overly paternalistic.154 In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the Court
suggested that the state could employ professional standards to protect the integrity
of pharmacists rather than the “highly paternalistic approach” of banning price
advertisements outright.155 The Court found the State’s effort to protect its interest
by suppressing information was exactly the kind of law that the First Amendment
sought to prevent.156 44 Liquormart adopted the same standard: “[The] State’s pa-
ternalistic assumption that the public will use truthful, nonmisleading commercial
information unwisely cannot justify a decision to suppress it.”157 The Court, in effect,
drew a line between regulations that completely ban communication of particular
classes of information and laws that regulate the manner in which the information is
conveyed.158 Theoretically, the State in 44 Liquormart could require stores to display
the accurate price of alcoholic beverages or mandate other disclosures for the pro-
tection of consumers, but it could not ban any mention of the price in an advertisement.
Sorrell tracked the reasoning in 44 Liquormart. While Vermont could require
pharmaceutical detailers to report accurate information and impose other restrictions
against undue influence, indirectly banning the practice of detailing impermissibly
encroached on the First Amendment rights of pharmaceutical companies.159 The
153 See generally Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410. The majority cites Central Hudson four
times, each for the proposition that commercial speech is generally afforded less protection
under the First Amendment. See id. at 415, 416, 422, 423.
154 Post, supra note 130, at 50–53.
155 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 770 (1976).
156 Id.
157 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 497 (1996).
158 Id. at 501 (“[W]hen a State entirely prohibits the dissemination of truthful, nonmi-
sleading commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining
process, there is far less reason to depart from the rigorous review that the First Amendment
generally demands.”).
159 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2669 (2011). The Court also suggested that
doctors who wished to avoid undue pressure from detailers could simply post “No Detailing”
signs on their doors or instruct their receptionists to send them away. Id. at 2670. The Supreme
Court recognized the First Amendment rights of corporate entities in Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); see also Tamara R. Piety, Commentary, Citizens
United and the Threat to the Regulatory State, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 16 (2010).
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Court noted that Vermont “offer[ed] no explanation” for why it chose not to pursue
content-based remedies.160 Arguably, Vermont could have limited the way in which
detailers presented information to physicians, but it could not entirely suppress
physician-identifying information “for what [it] perceives to be their own good.”161
The concern for paternalistic laws also overlaps with the fourth prong of the
Central Hudson test, which requires that the State’s interest could not be served by
a more limited restriction.162 More limited means, such as content-based restrictions,
are preferred over overly broad bans.163 Judicial skepticism toward paternalistic,
overbroad bans originated with Virginia State Board of Pharmacy and became
central to the commercial speech doctrine leading up to Sorrell. The tailoring analy-
sis required by Central Hudson has thus served as a means for the Court to scruti-
nize commercial speech more than mere rational basis.
3. Analogy to Time, Place, and Manner
Finally, restrictions barring misleading advertising are analogous to the time,
place, or manner restrictions that receive intermediate scrutiny review.164 In Ward
v. Rock Against Racism,165 the Court upheld a law requiring performers to play their
music at non-disruptive volumes.166 The ordinance at issue in Ward did not control
what could be the subject of the concert; it only limited the manner in which the
concert could be performed.167 Similarly, commercial speech, like pharmaceutical
detailing, could be limited by requirements that the speech not mislead or unduly
influence the targets of the advertising. By requiring an advertisement to convey
truthful information, governments do not control what may or may not be included
in an advertisement, but merely limit how that information is conveyed. Analyzing
certain commercial speech under noncommercial speech doctrines, therefore, will
not dramatically alter the results of commercial speech cases, but will offer benefits
over the current approach.
160 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2669.
161 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 503.
162 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
163 See id. at 565–66.
164 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). See generally Mark Spottswood,
Falsity, Insincerity, and the Freedom of Expression, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1203, 1211–
13 (2008) (describing why untruthful or misleading speech receives less protection under the
First Amendment). Judge Kozinski and Professor Banner argue that even under strict scrutiny,
it would be simple to uphold laws requiring advertisements to be non-misleading because the
government has a substantial interest in preventing consumer fraud. Kozinski & Banner, supra
note 10, at 651.
165 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
166 See id. at 789–90.
167 Id. at 787 & n.2
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C. Bans and Overbreadth
Recognizing that outright bans are almost always overbroad injects simplicity
into an otherwise complicated set of parallel doctrines in several ways. First, the cur-
rent focus on “overbreadth” has resulted in contradictory outcomes among multiple
circuits.168 Changing the judicial inquiry to a question of whether the regulation is an
outright ban would eliminate much of the balancing under Central Hudson and pro-
duce more consistent results. The pharmaceutical detailing cases highlight this point.
In Ayotte, the First Circuit concluded that under Central Hudson, New Hampshire’s
law barring the use of physician-identifying information for any commercial purpose
was the least restrictive means to accomplish the State’s goal, and therefore suffi-
ciently tailored.169 The Supreme Court, applying the same doctrine to similar facts,
however, reversed, finding that alternative, less restrictive means were available to
further the State’s interest.170 Central Hudson balancing would have been unneces-
sary had the courts recognized that bans, like the ban on physician-identifying infor-
mation for marketing or commercial purposes, are worthy of strict scrutiny.
Second, the focus on overbreadth forces the courts to delve into detailed, fact-
specific inquiries based on the type of regulation at issue. For example, in Coors, the
Court had to consider the competitive nature of the beer market, consumer percep-
tions of the alcohol content of particular beers, the extent to which consumers relied
on advertisements (as opposed to labels) in determining which beer to purchase, and
how the federal law varied in application based on different state regulatory schemes.171
The Court also discussed parallel practices in the spirits market and the effect of la-
beling beer “malt liquor” to circumvent the statute.172 This fact-intensive analysis re-
duces the precedential value of commercial speech cases because few cases are likely
to share nearly identical facts. An unpredictable and fact-intensive analysis also hurts
individual parties who will be unable to determine whether the First Amendment
protects what they intend to say without even a list of “relevant factors.” This doc-
trinal confusion ultimately causes a chilling effect on potential commercial speakers.
Third, the fact-intensive analysis to determine whether the government’s chosen
method of regulation is the least restrictive means is only one of four factors that
must be weighed under Central Hudson.173 Courts must also determine whether the
government proposes a substantial government interest, whether the regulation di-
rectly advances that government interest, and whether the proposed transaction is
168 Compare, e.g., IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 279–82 (2d. Cir. 2010), rev’d,
131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011), with IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 60 (1st Cir. 2008), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 2864 (2009).
169 Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 60.
170 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. 2653.
171 Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487–88 (1995).
172 Id. at 487.
173 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
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lawful and not misleading.174 Of course, the content-based First Amendment tests
also involve weighing government interests and analyzing how the regulation fur-
thers those interests, but the Central Hudson test adds additional factors that unneces-
sarily complicate the analysis when a ban should already signal the need to apply
strict scrutiny.
Fourth, as courts develop particular doctrines, they fill in gray areas and increase
clarity. Two parallel doctrines have resulted in two underdeveloped legal tests with
substantial gray areas. Because commercial speech was not even protected until 1975,175
courts have had few opportunities to articulate a clear application of the doctrine.
Collapsing part of what was formerly considered “commercial speech” into the more
developed content-based speech doctrine would eliminate some of the ambiguities
that plague current commercial speech cases.
D. Why Subject Bans to Greater Scrutiny?
This Section outlines the ways in which a ban on commercial speech differs from
other limitations on commercial speech. It emphasizes how bans implicate concerns
under the First Amendment in ways that other more limited restrictions do not. First,
because bans have a more significant effect on the speaker’s ability to communicate,
they are more likely to be driven by the message, rather than the mode of speaking.
Second, bans necessarily restrict the information available in the marketplace of ideas,
whereas other restrictions are less restrictive or may even increase the information
available. Finally, protecting commercial speech is more consistent with the Framers’
understanding of the First Amendment.
First, restricting commercial speech by means of a ban is more likely to be mo-
tivated by the subject matter of the transaction than any particularly bad speech
practice.176 Over-encompassing prohibitions allow the state to assert a negative as-
pect about a particular practice, product, or industry and use that fact to justify any
restrictions on a broader category of speech. As now-Justice Kagan observed, “content-
neutral laws often have content-based effects—and sometimes these are quite dra-
matic.”177 Outside the commercial speech realm, Kagan considers an example of a
law that prohibits all political parties from using billboards in a campaign.178 Kagan’s
example has a catch: only Democrats were using billboards to campaign.179 A content-
neutral ban can have a drastic content-based effect.180 Because bans need not ex-
plicitly state their purpose, they are more likely to endanger free speech while
174 See id.
175 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
176 See Fischette, supra note 124, at 686 (suggesting that bans on certain types of commer-
cial speech may conceal the legislature’s goals).
177 Kagan, supra note 8, at 446.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 See id.
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appearing innocuous.181 The Central Hudson Court recognized this possibility when
they incorporated the overbreadth factor into the traditional commercial speech
test,182 but Central Hudson does not allow courts to skip the other factors when over-
breadth so clearly signals a need to apply strict scrutiny. The following examples
illustrate how legislatures have used overbroad limitations to target the speech of an
entire industry.
In 44 Liquormart, the Court found that Rhode Island’s motivation for barring
stores from advertising the prices of alcoholic beverages was a desire to promote
temperance.183 The prices themselves had little to do with the State’s motivation, but
because alcohol can have a substantial negative effect on society, the Rhode Island
legislature restricted the industry’s advertising power.184 The same anti-alcohol policy
drove the regulation at issue in Coors, where the government believed that fear of
“strength wars” among breweries justified banning any advertisement that referred
to the alcoholic content of the beer.185 Neither the liquor store in 44 Liquormart nor
the breweries in Coors sought First Amendment protection for inaccurate or mis-
leading marketing techniques; they both sought simply the ability to include certain
information in their advertising materials. The speech restrictions at issue sought to
do more than ensure the accuracy of alcohol advertisements: they sought to curb
alcohol consumption. 44 Liquormart’s discussion of promoting temperance best illu-
strates this point.186 In both cases, the government sought to limit the advertisements
because they advertised alcohol, not because of any problem with the way the adver-
tisements promoted the underlying products. The alcoholic content provided the
justification for the restriction in the same way that the content in R.A.V. prompted
the regulation on cross burning.187 Had the Court evaluated either 44 Liquormart or
Coors under content-based tests, the Court would have surely concluded that neither
restriction was content-neutral, thus demanding strict scrutiny.
Similarly, prohibiting prescription drug detailers from misrepresenting the simi-
larities between the drugs they are pushing and the drugs a doctor prefers to pre-
scribe is different from banning prescription detailing outright. In the first case, the
government policy furthered is minimizing deceptive or misleading practices which
may negatively impact the prescribing practices of a particular physician. In the sec-
ond case, the government appears to take issue with the entire process of prescrip-
tion detailing. The restriction at issue in Sorrell is particularly compelling because
181 See Fischette, supra note 124, at 686 (discussing how speech restrictions can be em-
ployed to accomplish a legislature’s purpose while avoiding deliberation about whether the
legislature’s purpose is legitimate).
182 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
183 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 504 (1996).
184 Id. at 504–08.
185 Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 483–84 (1995).
186 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 504–08.
187 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992).
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the states appeared not only to target content—prescriber-identifying information—
but also particular speakers.188 The majority emphasized that due to the expense of
engaging in detailing, companies generally only detail “high-profit brand-name drugs
protected by patent.”189 More explicitly, the legislative history of the Vermont law
revealed that an explicit purpose in passing the law was to reduce the effectiveness
of pharmaceutical companies’ efforts to market name-brand drugs.190 Sorrell was
thus correct to point out that the Vermont law not only engaged in content-based
restrictions, but also sought to thwart particular speakers from spreading informa-
tion. The outright ban imposed by Vermont could thus be seen as a red flag that the
state sought to further an illegitimate purpose.
Second, bans directly limit the information that is available to the public. One
of the hallmarks of free speech is its ability to spread information.191 As Alexander
Meiklejohn noted, “The First Amendment is . . . a device for the sharing of whatever
truth has been won. Its purpose is to give to every voting member of the body politic
the fullest possible participation in the understanding of those problems with which
the citizens of a self-governing society must deal.”192 In Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy, the Court explained that its purpose in extending protection to commer-
cial speech was to encourage the free flow of information in the market place.193
Information in the market place serves a dual function: it informs consumers about
the products and services they purchase, and it provides information about how the
market functions for those who might seek to modify the market through regulation.
The information provided by commercial speech, even commercial speech that is
purely motivated by profit, contributes to “enlighten[ing] public decisionmaking in
a democracy.”194
188 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663 (2011).
189 Id. at 2660.
190 Id. at 2663 (“Formal legislative findings accompanying § 4631(d) confirm that the law’s
express purpose and practical effect are to diminish the effectiveness of marketing by manu-
facturers of brand-name drugs.”). On the danger of laws that attempt to equalize the speech
market, see Kagan, supra note 8, at 464–72.
191 See, e.g., Coase, supra note 10, at 1 (agreeing with Justice Holmes that the best test of
truth is the marketplace of ideas). However, some scholars argue that the promotion of more
information in the marketplace does not promote a more informed class of consumers be-
cause the information is unbalanced to favor those with greater financial abilities to spread
information. See, e.g., KERR, supra note 124, at 5. The threat of unbalanced information can
be substantially offset by regulations requiring that advertisements be non-misleading.
192 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 75 (1948).
193 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
765 (1976); see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 495 (1996) (“Even in
colonial days, the public relied on ‘commercial speech’ for vital information about the market.”).
194 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765 (stating that commercial speech is “indi-
spensible to the formation of intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated
or altered”).
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Commentators who have dubbed commercial speech the “Lochner” of the First
Amendment195 ignore this function of commercial speech. Such commentators also
fail to recognize that commercial speech—either as the Court currently protects it
or as I propose—does not preclude any regulation of advertising at all. Rather, by
subjecting only outright bans to strict scrutiny, the commercial speech doctrine can
more clearly serve its function of ensuring a more informed marketplace.
Blanket bans necessarily restrict speech that is not misleading or false. False or
misleading advertising negatively affects consumers by inducing them to enter into
contracts or purchase certain goods that they would not otherwise purchase had they
been given more truthful information.196 Indeed, Courts initiate the Central Hudson
test by asking whether the speech at issue is in any way misleading.197 The difference
between bans and limitations on the manner or truthfulness of information dispensed
aligns with the Court’s original justification for expanding First Amendment pro-
tection to commercial speech. Increasing the free flow of information increases the
public’s awareness about the characteristics of a product or service, allowing them
to make better decisions about what they wish to purchase. Banning types of infor-
mation, whether the alcoholic content of beer, the prices of prescription drugs, or
physician-identifying information, removes information from public discourse. By
contrast, requiring truthful advertising ensures that consumers have access to infor-
mation and ensures that the information is more accurate. Required warnings, also
subject to regulation,198 increase information about products and services in the
market, thus directly increasing the information available to consumers. In fact, the
Court has never afforded untruthful or misleading advertising protection under the
First Amendment.199
Third, protecting commercial speech aligns with the Framers’ original under-
standing of speech at the time they drafted the First Amendment. Inspired by Locke,
many of the Framers understood free government to be founded by a connection be-
tween property rights and free speech.200 Troy notes that the history of the colonial
195 See, e.g., Richard Samp, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Protecting Free Speech or Resurrecting
Lochner?, 2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 129, 129.
196 See Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 9, at 8–9 (arguing that protecting non-political speech
is absurd because it presumptively assumes that conspiracy, solicitation, perjury, and fraudulent
misrepresentation are protected).
197 Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 483 (1995) (beginning by observing that the
speech at issue is “only truthful, verifiable, and nonmisleading factual information”).
198 Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796–97 (1988) (finding that the Con-
stitution protects “the decision of both what to say and what not to say”); see also Jennifer
L. Pomeranz, Compelled Speech Under the Commercial Speech Doctrine: The Case of Menu
Label Laws, 12 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 159, 182–88 (2009).
199 KERR, supra note 124, at 235. But see United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012)
(overturning a conviction under the Stolen Valor Act for a defendant who falsely claimed to
receive the Congressional Medal of Honor).
200 Troy, supra note 10, at 94 (“This sacred privilege is so essential to free government,
that the security of property; and the freedom of speech, always go together; and in those
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press is a history of ubiquitous advertising, and papers like the New-York Mercury
filled as much as seventy percent of their pages with advertisements in 1766.201 One
of the best examples of early American activism, the protest of the Stamp Act, was
likely motivated in part by the Act’s effect on advertising.202 The Stamp Act re-
quired a charge of an additional two shillings per advertisement,203 and historians have
argued that the colonists framed their protest on freedom of expression grounds.204
That advertising dominated the press at a time when the colonists became fervent ad-
vocates of the freedom of expression at least hints that advertising was valued at the
time of the founding. The connection between property rights and speech rights also
suggests that the Court’s later effort to sever commercial speech from other speech
was inconsistent with the founders’ views about the forms of valuable expression.
E. Is Commercial Speech Less Valuable?
Many scholars have argued that even if the First Amendment generally values
more information over less information, information about the market is simply less
important than information about politics and other protected speech.205 This argu-
ment is overstated for several reasons. First, information about the market is valu-
able for individual consumers. When advertisers emphasize certain qualities about
their products, the public learns more generally about a product and the options that
are available. Second, increasing available information allows the market to more
accurately reveal what consumers demand, providing product designers with infor-
mation vital to design new products. Third, advertising reveals information about
the culture of the target audience.206 Professor Daniel Halberstam argues that this
information indirectly informs one’s understanding of what is just and good, shaping
the values that ultimately inform noncommercial speech.207 By adopting particular
wretched countries where a man cannot call his tongue his own, he can scarce call anything
else his own.” (quoting Of Freedom of Speech: That the Same Is Inseparable from Publick
Liberty, in CATO’S LETTERS: ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS AND OTHER IMPORTANT
SUBJECTS 110 (London, Wilkins, Woodward, Walthoe & Peele 1720))).
201 Id. at 99.
202 Id. at 101.
203 Id.
204 ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, PRELUDE TO INDEPENDENCE: THE NEWSPAPER WAR ON
BRITAIN 1764–1776, at 70–71 (1957).
205 See, e.g., Berman, supra note 9, at 795; Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 9, at 14 (“Mea-
sured in terms of traditional first amendment principles, commercial speech is remarkable
for its insignificance.”); Schauer, supra note 9, at 1201 (arguing that expanding the breadth
of the First Amendment has little perceivable empirical effect, but dilutes psychological and
social conceptions of free speech).
206 See Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitu-
tional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 810 (1999).
207 Id. (“Indeed, the expansive view goes even further to hold that citizens must not only
have access to information as input for their private calculus about the public good, but that
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marketing strategies, advertising does more than inform us about the cheapest place
to purchase a particular product. Fourth, commercial information is more than the
prices or alcoholic content of beer, as the central commercial speech cases lead one
to believe. Commercial information influences important decisions like where one
lives, the school where one’s children study, and how one invests their savings.208
Whether commercial speech is valued for its indirect method of influencing more
valued speech or for its information-distributing function, commercial speech has
tremendous value in a democratic society.
The First Amendment also protects some kinds of speech that arguably con-
tribute very little to political discourse. For example, one’s trip to the grocery store
could reveal a panoply of informative Weekly World News headlines, such as “Kim
Jong-Il Killed by Chuck Norris!”209 or “Aliens Support Ron Paul in Iowa.”210 The
Court has also found that the First Amendment protects non-political expression like
nude dancing, which arguably contributes little to either political discourse or the
marketplace of information.211 Even a cursory glance at protected expression renders
the commercial-noncommercial distinction a curious place to draw the line between
preferred and less valuable expression. There is no doubt that some forms of polit-
ical speech are highly valuable, but how can protecting commercial speech dilute
their value anymore than it is now?
Even if commercial speech is less important than other types of protected speech,
the justification for greater scrutiny suffers from a false assumption.212 Courts scru-
tinize restrictions on free expression out of fear that lawmakers occasionally suffer
from impure motives and otherwise imprudent policy decisions.213 Reduced scrutiny
for restrictions on commercial expression assumes that the government will be so
“competent in action and pure in motivation” that it can regulate commercial speech
with reduced judicial oversight.214 In reality, whether the expression at issue is
commercial has little to do with lawmakers’ propensity to regulate based on ill-
conceived policy justifications or ulterior motives. Because lawmakers may regulate
out of impure motives or poor policy decisions regardless of the commercial nature
of the regulated expression, courts should protect commercial speech, or at least
they must also be exposed to thoughts, beliefs, and ideas about the human condition in order
to develop the critical faculties necessary to perform that calculus.”).
208 See Coase, supra note 10, at 14.
209 Frank Lake, Kim Jong-Il Killed by Chuck Norris!, WKLY. WORLD NEWS, Dec. 19, 2011,
http://weeklyworldnews.com/headlines/41548/kim-jong-ii-killed-by-chuck-norris/.
210 Frank Lake, Aliens Support Ron Paul in Iowa, WKLY. WORLD NEWS, Jan. 3, 2012,
http://weeklyworldnews.com/politics/41939/aliens-support-ron-paul-in-iowa/.
211 See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
212 Coase, supra note 10, at 2.
213 Id.
214 Id.
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particular types of commercial speech, with the same zeal with which they protect
noncommercial speech.215
Commercial speech may also spread noncommercial information.216 Advertisers
are frequently motivated not only to encourage people to buy their products but also
to increase support for the company among its workers or influence public opinion
in a way that favors the business.217 In some cases, the commercial speech may be
difficult to distinguish from the noncommercial message. For example, if a company
were to encourage voters to vote against a proposed issue affecting the company’s
business, is the company trying to influence politics, or is it merely marketing its
product?218 What if the advertisement sought to sell a book espousing certain ideas?219
In addition to sorting out whether the speech in question is commercial or noncom-
mercial, the facility of mixing the two may prevent commercial actors from engaging
in protected noncommercial speech altogether.220 A commercial actor, merely by
promoting its product, may convert its entire message into commercial speech with
less protection than the message would receive had the speaker not had a product to
promote.221 That commercial speech may be difficult to extract from a noncommer-
cial context necessitates greater protection for commercial speech for the sake of the
noncommercial speech even if the commercial speech is less valuable.
Subjecting bans on commercial speech to strict scrutiny does not hamstring
legislators looking out for consumer interests either. I do not advocate eliminating
bans on commercial speech or prohibiting all regulation of commercial speech; I
would simply require courts to subject outright bans to more searching scrutiny.
Most regulations on commercial speech, like warning labels or requirements that
advertisements not mislead, would not be subject to strict scrutiny. Even bans, if
narrowly tailored to further compelling government interests, could survive. Sub-
jecting bans to strict scrutiny simply recognizes that bans are unlikely to be the least
restrictive means of furthering government interests that are rarely relevant to the
speech itself.
215 See Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982) (arguing
that if some speech is afforded greater protection, that determination should be based on an
individualized balancing inquiry between the merits of free expression and regulation, rather
than a distinction that values some types of speech more than others).
216 See Brudney, supra note 38, at 1157–58.
217 See, e.g., Coase, supra note 10, at 9.
218 See Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 515 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(noting that if Congress had denied deductions for claimants who engage in certain speech,
it would be a violation of the First Amendment).
219 See Coase, supra note 10, at 21.
220 Brudney, supra note 38, at 1159 (observing that “virtually every public pronouncement
by a seller of products or services that mentions or calls attention to those products or ser-
vices can plausibly be portrayed as part of a sales effort that constitutes commercial speech”).
221 Id. at 1159–60.
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But even if market-based information is all that commercial speech produces,
affording commercial speech greater protection under the First Amendment does not
detract from more valuable forms of speech.222 If anything, the Court’s apparent
willingness to expand the scope of the First Amendment demonstrates a commit-
ment to the values embodied within it.223 Because the vast majority of laws invali-
dated under Central Hudson are rejected based on their tailoring to an otherwise
important government interest, subjecting bans to strict scrutiny simplifies more
than it complicates. And even if asking whether a law bans a class of commercial
information creates an added step (to be followed by strict scrutiny), this approach
follows an already well-established body of doctrine.
F. Why Maintain Central Hudson?
Central Hudson recognized that truly commercial speech differs in purpose
from other forms of speech, affording protection because the speech serves only an
“informational function.”224 The most common argument for maintaining a distinct
commercial speech doctrine is discussed above—commercial speech is simply less
valuable than political speech because it does not contribute to the democratic
process.225 Advertisements that do no more than propose a commercial transaction
contribute little to debates about political and social issues. Advertisements play, at
most, a minor role in checking power, a primary purpose of the First Amendment.
In fact, commercial speech arguably endorses materialistic values contrary to dem-
ocratic principles.226
Commercial speech is also more falsifiable than noncommercial speech.227 Whether
an individual can purchase the newest car model for a particular price can easily be
verified by visiting the dealership and speaking with a salesperson. Whether the
government should increase environmental regulations, by contrast, is a normative
judgment that might be supported by facts but is itself unfalsifiable. That the content
of commercial speech might be verified decreases the fear that regulation is based
on disagreement with the content. Put differently, if regulations require the content
222 See Stern, supra note 29, at 109 (noting that any “dilution” of other speech protection
is disparate and “exceedingly difficult to detect”).
223 Professor Nat Stern observes that the era of expanded commercial speech protection
is also the era in which the Court expanded protection to individual rights and liberties. Id.
at 109–10.
224 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980).
225 See, e.g., Edward J. Eberle, Practical Reason: The Commercial Speech Paradigm, 42
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 411, 461 (1992); Fischette, supra note 124, at 678–88; Post, supra
note 130, at 4. See generally James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value
of American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491 (2011) (promoting the democracy-
based theory to explain the pattern of the Supreme Court’s opinions).
226 See Eberle, supra note 225, at 466.
227 See id. at 470–71.
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of commercial speech to be true, one can determine whether specific restrictions
were valid by verifying the accuracy of the restricted statement. The practical sim-
plicity of regulating commercial speech thus distinguishes commercial from non-
commercial speech and makes regulating the former more defensible.228
Historically, there were also limits on speech short of outright bans. Inspired by
Blackstone and the common law tradition, the colonies prohibited speech that con-
tained a misrepresentation.229 Thomas Jefferson considered the right to speak an un-
limited right with the exception of “false facts affecting injuriously the life, liberty,
property or reputation of others.”230 The common law did prohibit advertising “un-
lawful products” under doctrines barring solicitation of criminal behavior,231 but
similar laws would likely withstand strict scrutiny today. Thus, at the time the First
Amendment was drafted, the Framers held the freedom of expression in the highest
regard, but they understood that freedom to entail reasonable limits.
Central Hudson, or some lesser form of scrutiny, should be maintained for an-
other reason: some commercial speech is in need of carefully limited regulation that
may not survive strict scrutiny. For example, although the health threats of smoking
cigarettes are well known, tobacco companies have been tremendously successful
in marketing their products, especially to those who are too young to know the
difference.232 Underage smokers are easily persuaded by advertising and not easily
dissuaded by textual warning labels.233 To combat the power of advertising with the
comparative failure of warning labels, regulators have a number of options, such as
prohibiting tobacco advertisements on billboards or eliminating persuasive mascots
like Joe Camel.234 Preventing youths from starting an unhealthy addiction to ciga-
rettes does not require a ban on all cigarette advertising, but it might require less
restrictive limits on the places in which tobacco companies can advertise and the
appearance or character of the advertisements.
In addition to limiting the undue influence of harmful products like cigarettes,
misleading commercial speech, regardless of the advertised product, is harmful to
228 See id. at 476–83 (proposing a new commercial speech framework based on whether
the information disseminating is true, true but misleading, or false).
229 Troy, supra note 10, at 106.
230 Id. (quoting 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 367, 367 (J. Boyd ed., 1958)).
231 Id. at 107.
232 See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31 § 2, 123
Stat. 1776, 1777 (2009) (codified at 21 U.S.C. 387 (2006)) (“Virtually all new users of tobacco
products are under the minimum legal age to purchase such products.”).
233 See Recent Case, D.C. Circuit Holds that FDA Rule Mandating Graphic Warning
Images on Cigarette Packaging and Advertisements Violates First Amendment, 126 HARV.
L. REV. 818, 819 (2013) (citing Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements,
75 Fed. Reg. 69,524, 69,531 (proposed Nov. 12, 2010)).
234 For an argument that the billboard regulation and the prohibition against Joe Camel
pass the Central Hudson test, see Donald W. Garner & Richard J. Whitney, Protecting Children
from Joe Camel and His Friends: A New First Amendment and Federal Preemption Analysis
of Tobacco Billboard Regulation, 46 EMORY L.J. 479 (1997).
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all consumers.235 Examples of regulations that prevent misleading advertising abound.
For example, in the wake of the financial crisis, the SEC has promulgated rules limit-
ing what companies can imply about the future performance of mutual funds.236
States have also sought to limit advertisements by pregnancy care centers that mi-
srepresent the health effects of abortion.237 Others have called for greater account-
ability for misleading political advertisements.238 Whether the advertiser seeks to
win votes by misleading the electorate, overstate the upside potential of an invest-
ment, or downplay the risks of a health procedure, it is clear that some limits are
necessary. The solution in these cases, however, is not to prohibit advertising about
mutual funds, pregnancy care, or political office, but to impose more limited restric-
tions that protect consumers from misleading advertisements.
The problem with applying strict scrutiny to laws that prohibit misleading ad-
vertising or bar advertising schemes like Joe Camel is that those restrictions, while
more limited than a ban, may not survive strict scrutiny. Sorrell itself makes clear
that strict scrutiny is the death knell for regulations of free speech as the dissent
argues that the Vermont law would withstand intermediate scrutiny under Central
Hudson.239 In fact, only twenty-two percent of all speech restrictions subjected to
strict scrutiny have passed constitutional muster.240
Post-Sorrell commercial speech decisions support the trend, with courts striking
down commercial speech restrictions under either strict scrutiny or “heightened”
intermediate scrutiny. At least one lower court has interpreted Sorrell to require strict
scrutiny, striking down the restriction at issue.241 Other courts have applied a more
searching form of intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson, usually interpreting
Sorrell to require the restriction to directly further the purported state interest.242 And
235 See generally Helen Norton, Secrets, Lies, and Disclosure, 27 J.L. & POL. 641, 648–55
(2012).
236 See Alan R. Palmiter & Ahmed E. Taha, Mutual Fund Performance Advertising:
Inherently and Materially Misleading?, 46 GA. L. REV. 289, 292 (2012). 
237 See Jennifer M. Keighley, Can You Handle the Truth? Compelled Commercial Speech
and the First Amendment, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 539, 596–98 (2012).
238 Gerald G. Ashdown, Distorting Democracy: Campaign Lies in the 21st Century, 20
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1085 (2012).
239 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2679 (2011) (Breyer, J. dissenting) (“I be-
lieve Vermont’s statute survives application of Central Hudson’s ‘intermediate’ commercial
speech standard . . . .”).
240 Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 815 (2006).
241 See Wollschlaeger v. Farmer, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1262 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (“In Sorrell
v. IMS Health Inc. the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to a law involving commercial
speech . . . .”).
242 See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets, Inc. v. City of Worchester, 851 F. Supp. 2d
311, 312, 318–19 (D. Mass. 2012) (invalidating a law that prohibited outdoor advertisements
of tobacco products).
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although the court did not analyze the question under commercial speech, the Fourth
Circuit used strict scrutiny to strike down a law requiring providers of pregnancy-
related services to post conspicuous signs advertising that the provider could refer
patients to other physicians for birth control or abortion services.243
Not all advertisers have the greater good in mind when they decide how to mar-
ket their products and services. The fact that commercial speech, by definition, pro-
poses a commercial transaction, is evidence that the speaker has something else in
mind. The solution is not to ban those speakers from sharing their message at all, but
to limit the bad ways in which they could convey that message. Historically, strict
scrutiny has not been friendly to such limited speech restrictions, and the recent
history of applying Sorrell predicts that the trend will continue. Subjecting over-
broad bans to strict scrutiny stabilizes the line between overzealous regulation of
potentially informative commercial speech and ensuring that those who choose to
engage in commercial speech do not take advantage of their listeners.
Although commercial speech is frequently falsifiable and not generally the most
valued speech, the commercial-noncommercial division is not clean enough to sup-
port maintaining its current doctrinal divide. Pure commercial speech still has infor-
mational value and may contain an underlying political or social message.244 By the
same token, not all advertisements are so easily falsifiable. How does one prove that
the newest sleep aid will give you the best sleep you have had in years, for example?
Extending strict scrutiny to commercial speech bans best balances the need to prevent
overbroad restrictions on commercial speech while maintaining the elevated value
of noncommercial speech. The intermediate scrutiny of Central Hudson compromises
by recognizing that when an overly broad ban is not at stake, the verifiability and
nondemocratic nature of commercial speech require less exacting judicial protection.
IV. THE STRICT SCRUTINY–BAN TEST AND SORRELL
Now that I have laid out the reasons to prefer the strict scrutiny for commercial
speech bans, an illustration of the test along the facts of Sorrell may prove useful.
First, because Sorrell concerns physician-identifying information for marketing or
commercial purposes, it falls within the realm of commercial speech. If the “com-
mercial” label were not enough, Sorrell, in particular, concerns pharmaceutical
detailing, a form of advertisement.245 Advertisements are the quintessential form of
commercial speech.246 Furthermore, because the physician-identifying information
243 Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Balt., 683
F.3d 539, 548, 556 (4th Cir. 2012).
244 For example, are advertisements for an abortion clinic political or social? See Bigelow
v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
245 IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 267 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
246 See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 9, at 1183.
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is neither false nor misleading, it falls within the scope of commercial speech that
the strict scrutiny–ban test is designed to analyze.
The first question—whether a ban on physician-identifying information consti-
tutes a ban on a class of information—is satisfied because those with market or
commercial purposes may not use prescriber-identifying information. While the
laws technically only bar the use of such information for marketing purposes, they
deprive any actor in the market from taking advantage of the information. The First
Amendment protects such speech in the market precisely because the market func-
tions more efficiently when actors, such as physicians, are well informed about the
products and services available. Limiting the use of prescriber-identifying informa-
tion to noncommercial purposes therefore deprives the market of such information.
While one could argue that limiting the ban to commercial or marketing pur-
poses is more analogous to time, place, or manner restrictions, the legislative history
of the Vermont statute refutes this point.247 Specifically, the legislative history in-
dicates that Vermont believed the message conveyed by pharmaceutical detailers to
be “in conflict with the goals of the [S]tate.”248 The Vermont legislature demon-
strated a clear intent to enact a ban harmful to detailers rather than to place limited
restrictions on either the truthfulness of the message conveyed or the manner in
which detailers visit physicians to market their products.249 Absent these limitations,
Vermont effectively enacted a ban on the dissemination of prescriber-identifying in-
formation. This simple preliminary question—whether the restriction is a ban—saves
the four factor Central Hudson test and subjects the law to more exacting scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
The question of whether commercial speech sits on an even playing field with
highly valued political speech is divisive. On one hand, political speech seems far
more directly relevant to the values of democratic government, but on the other,
commercial speech offers a wealth of information. That the question is difficult is
reflected in the commercial speech doctrine, as the Court first proclaims that com-
mercial speech was never protected, then finds reason to afford that speech minimal
protection, and only later incrementally increases that protection. After Sorrell, the
question is where the commercial speech doctrine will go next.
I offer a middle ground proposal for the next step in expanding protection for
commercial speech. By drawing a distinction between outright bans of particular
information and restrictions on how those facts are portrayed, I divide commercial
speech into two classes. Because bans are far more sweeping and more likely to im-
plicate the justifications for protecting political speech, the Court should recognize
247 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2663.
248 Id. (quoting 2007 Vt. Acts & Resolves 80, § 1(3)).
249 Id. at 2672.
2013] DETAILING COMMERCIAL SPEECH 1323
that bans are suspect enough to justify strict scrutiny. By asking whether the speech
constitutes a ban, the Court can easily avoid the four-factor balancing test that has
led to mixed results in the lower courts. Instead, bans enter the traditional content-
based doctrine, and only mere time, place, or manner restrictions remain under the
Central Hudson test. Whether this test should be the ultimate commercial speech
test is a separate question. What seems clear is that at least some commercial speech
deserves more judicial protection. By elevating the scrutiny under Central Hudson
to strict scrutiny when the law in question enacts a ban, courts can afford commer-
cial speech more protection when the commercial speech appears most in need of
judicial intervention. Whether the Court should expand strict scrutiny to commercial
speech restrictions that stop short of a ban remains an open question.
